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NONE OF THEIR BUSINESS: THE NEED FOR
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE TO NEW YORK’S
BAIL BOND BUSINESS
Andrea Clisura
INTRODUCTION
On a Friday afternoon at approximately 5:00 p.m., the phone
rings in the office of Vanguard Bail Bonds (“Vanguard”).1 A
woman is calling to bail someone out of jail2—a friend, a family
member, someone she cares for enough to help. The judge has set
bail at $2,000.3 John Medina, a New York bail bondsman, quickly
sums up what he needs from the caller.4 The fee will be $200, in
accordance with New York statutory law limiting the fee to ten
percent of the bond.5 But the caller will need $800 upfront, $600 of
which will be deposited into an escrow account.6 This $600 is the
collateral requirement imposed by Mr. Medina and the large
national insurance company backing Vanguard.7 An agent contract
 J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A. New York University,
2005. Thank you to my parents, the members of the Journal of Law and Policy,
and all those who shared a bit of their time and experience.
1
Interview with John Medina, Bail Bondsman, Vanguard Bail Bonds
Agency, Inc., in Queens, N.Y. (Oct. 2, 2009) (observed during personal
interview).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(a) (McKinney 2009). A ten percent charge is
the limit for bonds or deposits not in excess of $3,000. Where bonds or deposits
exceed $3,000, the licensee may charge an additional eight percent of the excess
up to $10,000 and six percent of any amount exceeding $10,000. Id.
6
Interview with John Medina, supra note 1.
7
Id.; see also People v. James, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1999, at 31, col. 2 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County June 3, 1999) (describing procedures typically employed by
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with such an approved insurance company is a requirement for
conducting a bail bond business in New York.8 The bond posted by
the bondsperson, as agent, is in essence an agreement that the
insurance company will pay the state the full amount of the bond if
the defendant fails to appear in court.9 Vanguard and the insurance
company are betting $2,000 that the accused will make all of his or
her court appearances10 and they want collateral to back their
wager.11 The caller will need to come into Vanguard’s office with
identification, a utility bill, and her most recent paystub.12 The
judge will want to know who she is, where she lives, and what she
does for a living, Mr. Medina explains.13 If the defendant appears
as required by the court throughout the action, the $600 collateral
an International Fidelity Insurance Company agent to determine the sufficiency
of collateral).
8
See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6801 (McKinney 2009) (providing that no person,
firm, or corporation may engage in a bail bond business “[e]xcept for a
corporation authorized to write fidelity and surety insurance and to do a bail
bond business pursuant to the provisions of article eleven” of the Insurance
Law); N.Y. INS. LAW § 6802(a) (McKinney 2009) (“No person, firm or
corporation or any officer or employee thereof shall act in this state as an agent
or solicitor of an insurer doing a bail bond business in soliciting, negotiating or
effectuating any such deposit or bail bond by such insurer unless licensed by the
superintendent as an agent pursuant to the provisions of this section.”); see also
Bail Bonds Active Agent Listing, N.Y. INS. DEP’T, https://awebproxyprd.ins.
state.ny.us/onepage/StartForm.jsp?link=/LICAppsAlice/LIC_BB_Search.jsp
(choose “Bail Bondsman Type”) (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (listing insurance
companies that have agents licensed in New York as well as individual and
corporate agents).
9
See Mary T. Phillips, Making Bail in New York City: Commercial Bonds
and Cash Bail, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 19, 96 (Mar. 2010),
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/bailmaking2010.pdf [hereinafter Making Bail
in New York City].
10
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 540.10–.30 (McKinney 2009) (regarding
bail forfeiture and remission).
11
See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 30–34 (discussing
types and amounts of collateral accepted by bond agents in Manhattan and
Brooklyn).
12
Interview with John Medina, supra note 1.
13
Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.20(4)(a)(ii) (McKinney 2009)
(providing that a justifying affidavit on an insurance company bail bond must
include the name, occupation, and residential and business address of each
indemnitor on the bond).

None of Their Business

309

payment will be returned to the caller.14
Two thousand dollars is a fairly common bail amount.15 In fact,
it was the median amount set at criminal court arraignments in
New York City in 2008.16 Because the court is required to take the
defendant’s criminal history into account when setting bail, the
amount of bail may not reveal very much about the nature of the
current offense.17 If the defendant has a prior criminal record, the
offense might not be particularly serious.18 Since the court set bail
bond at $2,000, it is possible, though not particularly likely, that a
cash alternative was set in a lower amount of perhaps $1,000.19
14

See supra note 5 (explaining New York’s statutory limit on bail bonding

fees).
15

See Annual Report 2008, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 21
(Dec. 2009), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/annual08.pdf (reporting that
twenty-four percent of New York City bail amounts were set in the range of
$1,001 to $2,500); see also id. at 22 (explaining that when bond is ordered with
a lower cash alternative, the agency sometimes reports only the lower amount as
the bail amount).
16
Id. at 21.
17
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2009) (listing the
possible sentence upon conviction as just one of a variety of factors that the
court is directed to consider when setting bail). In fact, unlike under federal law,
where a court is permitted to consider the safety of the community when
determining whether a defendant should be detained pretrial, see United States
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality of
preventive detention as provided for in the Bail Reform Act of 1984), New York
law currently provides that when a court exercises its discretion in setting the
form or amount of bail, it should take into account only “the kind and degree of
control or restriction that is necessary to secure his court attendance when
required.” CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a); see also CRIM. PROC. § 510.30 cmt.;
JOHN S. GOLDKAMP ET AL., PERSONAL LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY:
PRETRIAL RELEASE IN THE CRIMINAL COURT 6 (1995) [hereinafter PERSONAL
LIBERTY]. Nonetheless, a New York court must consider the principal’s
character and criminal record, CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a), which could
indirectly bear on any potential threat an accused’s release might pose to the
community.
18
See CRIM. PROC. § 510.30(2)(a)(iv) (providing that the court must take
into account the defendant’s criminal record in exercising its discretion to set
bail). But see id. § 510.30(1) (providing that in limited circumstances
applications for bail must be determined as a matter of law).
19
See Mary T. Phillips & Elyse J. Revere, Factors Influencing Release and
Bail Decisions in New York City: Part 1. Manhattan, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE

310

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

Regardless of whether a lower cash alternative has been set, a
defendant who has the financial resources has no need to secure
pretrial release through a bail bondsperson; that defendant can
simply put up the full amount in cash,20 avoiding the premium
charged by the bondsperson.21
An individual who lacks enough cash to post bail and must
instead seek out a bondsperson might face two distinct problems.
First, where bail is set low, it may not be possible to locate a
bondsperson who is willing to post bond.22 Bondspersons rarely
ever write bonds for less than $1,000.23 Under a typical agent
contract, the bondsperson might pocket approximately $345 on a
$5,000 bond, $150 on a $2,000 bond, and $75 on a $1,000 bond.24
For the work involved, most bail bond businesses will not see a
AGENCY, INC., 13 (July 2004), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/bail1.pdf
[hereinafter Factors Part 1]. By observing Manhattan arraignments for seven
months during 2001 and 2002, the New York City Criminal Justice Agency, Inc.
(“CJA”) found that in eighty-three percent of cases no lower cash alternative
was set, and that when an alternative was set, it was usually at least half of the
bond amount. Id. at 1, 13. The CJA report notes that a cash alternative is not
really an alternative to bond unless it is set at less than the amount that a
bondsperson would require as collateral. Id. at 13. See also Making Bail in New
York City, supra note 9, at 52–57 (reporting similar results for a 2005 sample).
20
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.15(1) (McKinney 2009) (providing
that, where the court has fixed bail, “cash bail in the amount designated in the
order fixing bail may be posted even though such bail was not specified in such
order”).
21
The city does, however, retain a three percent fee when a case ends with
a conviction. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 99-m (McKinney 2007); What You Should
Know Before You Pay Bail, N.Y.C. DEP’T FIN. (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.nyc.
gov/html/dof/html/pdf/07pdf/pay-bail.pdf.
22
See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 18.
23
Id.
24
On a $5,000 bond, there would be a ten percent premium on the first
$3,000 and an eight percent premium on the remaining $2,000. See N.Y. INS.
LAW § 6804(a) (McKinney 2009). The resulting $460 premium would be
apportioned between the insurance company and the bondsperson in accordance
with their agent contract. Interview with John Medina, supra note 1; see also
People v. James, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1999, at 31, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
June 3, 1999) (“The proportion of the split is determined through negotiation
between the agent and the insurance company.”). Accordingly, on the $5,000
bond, if a contract provided that twenty-five percent of the premium would be
collected by the insurance company, the bondsperson would collect $345.
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profit of less than $100 as worth the time or energy.25 Even smaller
companies, like Mr. Medina’s, have limits on how low a bond they
will post.26 Bondspersons are businesspeople. With a ten percent
premium, and a percentage of that premium going to the insurance
company that is underwriting the bond, it is rarely worth the
paperwork, time, and gasoline that it takes to bail a person out of
jail for a profit that could amount to less than $50.27 The second,
more obvious problem is that even when bail is set in amounts that
a bondsperson is willing to post, many of the defendants caught in
New York City’s criminal justice system have difficulty producing
sufficient collateral.28 They, or their friends or relatives, may lack
the cash, property, or real estate to secure the bond.29 One of the
consequences of the current system is that some defendants are
incarcerated pretrial simply because they cannot afford bail set at
just a few hundred dollars.30 A New York City Criminal Justice
25

Interview with John Medina, supra note 1.
Id.
27
A bond of $500 or less would bring a profit of under $50. See supra note
24 (calculating fee distributions).
28
See, e.g., Annual Report 2008, supra note 15, at 9 (finding fifty-one
percent of defendants between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine employed
full-time); Prisoner Profile, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y. (Mar. 2006), http://www.
correctionalassociation.org/publications/download/pvp/factsheets/prisoner_profi
le_2006.pdf; see also Reentry Facts, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., http://www.
nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/facts (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (citing high
instances of mental health issues and substance abuse problems and low rates of
education and employment among prisoners and jail inmates nationwide).
29
See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 30 (showing that,
typically, Manhattan and Brooklyn bond agents accepted cash collateral alone);
see also Adam Liptak, World Spurns Bail for Profit, But It’s a Pillar of U.S.
Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A1 (“[This Florida bondsman] has
accepted rugs, an airplane and a winning Rhode Island lottery ticket. But mostly
he is interested in houses.”).
30
See, e.g., Mary T. Phillips, Research Brief No. 14: Bail, Detention, &
Nonfelony Case Outcomes, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 7 (May
2007), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief14.pdf [hereinafter Research Brief
No. 14] (“[N]early half of detained defendants [in the sample] served time in jail
only because they were unable to post bail.”); Annual Report 2008, supra note
15, at 22 (“The ability to post bail at arraignment was rare even when the
amount of bail was very low. For cases with bail amounts of $500 or less, bail
was made at arraignment in 16% of cases.”).
26
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Agency, Inc. (“CJA”) study determined that in over a quarter of
nonfelony cases where bail was set at just $750 or less, detention
lasted for a week or longer.31 For some defendants, bail set in
almost any amount can constitute an extreme hardship.32
In the 1980s, New York City bail bondspersons, also referred
to as bail bond agents, nearly disappeared, but because the money
bail system did not disappear with them, levels of pretrial
incarceration remained high.33 One researcher concluded that the
role of the commercial bondsperson had decreased so dramatically
in New York City that “bail bonds were too rare to be of much
policy relevance.”34 Of much greater significance, the study
concluded, was the judicial bail determination, particularly, the
decision whether to set a lower cash alternative.35 Since the time of
that study, the fee a bondsperson is permitted to charge has
doubled in most cases, increasing the industry’s profit potential.36
In March of 2010, the CJA released findings from the first phase of
an analysis of bail-making in New York City connected to a
dataset of arrests that occurred over three months in 2005.37 By
gathering information manually from paper documents maintained
in courthouses and detention facilities throughout the Bronx,
Brooklyn, Manhattan, and Queens, researchers collected data on
the form of bail posted and the amount of cash bondspersons

31

Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 7.
See, e.g., id.; see also infra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (noting
possible consequences of pretrial incarceration).
33
See Michele Sviridoff, Bail Bonds and Cash Alternatives: The Influence
of “Discounts” on Bail-Making in New York City, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 131, 133,
135, 144–46 (1986).
34
Id. at 135. The research, which involved matching bail records up with a
unique CJA dataset, id. at 133–34, revealed that only three percent of defendants
who made bail used the services of a bondsperson. Id. at 135.
35
Id. at 141 (“The availability of a cash alternative seems more important
to a defendant’s bail-making ability than the face amount of the bail set . . . .”).
36
Compare id. at 145 n.20 (noting that the fee at the time was five percent
of the bond), with N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(a) (McKinney 2009) (setting out New
York’s fee structure for bail bonds). This holds true for most cases, but where
the bond exceeds $3,000, a slightly lesser amount is charged on the excess. See
id.
37
Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 2, 9.
32
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collected in fees and collateral.38 The report confirms that bail
bond agents are more active today than they were in the 1980s;39
however, there are still many defendants who derive no benefit
from their existence—those who cannot afford their fee and those
with very low—and thus unprofitable—bail amounts.
The debate continues between groups who see the commercial
bonding industry as unjust and unfair40 and those who see it as a
public service, or at least a lesser evil—important and effective.41
A Florida bondsman profiled in the New York Times sums up one
perspective, saying: “[T]axpayers have to pay for [government
pretrial release] programs.42 Why should they . . . [w]hen we can
provide the same service for free[?] I’d rather see the money spent
in parks, [on] mental health issues, the homeless. Let the private
sector do it. We do it better.”43 But bondspersons are not providing
a service for free.44 Defendants—accused of crimes, but not
convicted—pay them for release.45 And if bondspersons do not
care to participate when bail is set low, taxpayers still pay to
incarcerate those individuals who cannot afford to post cash bail on
their own.46 Nonetheless, just four states have abolished the
38

Id. at 6, 9.
Id. at 67.
40
See, e.g., Advocacy Brief: The Truth About Commercial Bail Bonding in
America, NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AGENCIES 1–4 (Aug. 2009),
http://www.napsa.org/publications/napsafandp1.pdf
[hereinafter
Advocacy
Brief].
41
See generally Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive:
Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail Jumping, 47 J.L.
& ECON. 93 (2004) (purporting not to take sides in the debate, but offering data
to show that the commercial bonding industry is effective).
42
Pretrial programs vary widely in the types of services they provide. See
JOHN CLARK & D. ALAN HENRY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRETRIAL SERVICES
PROGRAMMING AT THE START OF THE 21ST CENTURY: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL
SERVICES PROGRAMS 1, 39–42 (2003) (explaining that some programs are
limited to collecting and verifying information about defendants, whereas others
are engaged in pretrial supervision of varying degrees of intensity).
43
Liptak, supra note 29.
44
See, e.g., Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 28 (reporting
that bond agents generally charge the maximum fee permitted by law).
45
See, e.g., id.
46
See, e.g., Cost of Pre-Trial Detention in City Jails Takes Bite Out of Big
39
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commercial bail system—Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and
Wisconsin.47 Nationally, reliance on commercial bail remains
high.48
While some continue to call for more systemic reform, others
have tried to affect change through the money bail system itself.49
By investing money to bail the indigent out of jail, these activists
may not achieve the fundamental reform that many advocates
prefer,50 but the tactic has the more immediate benefit of helping
defendants to obtain their release. In Bail Out: The Community

Apple’s Budget, N.Y.C. INDEP. BUDGET OFFICE (Jan. 24, 2000), http://www.ibo.
nyc.ny.us/publicationsSocialCommunity.html (follow “Cost of Pre-Trial
Detention in City Jails Takes Bite Out of Big Apple’s Budget” hyperlink under
“Criminal Justice”).
47
Advocacy Brief, supra note 40, at 4. Reliance on commercial bail is far
from inevitable. See F. E. DEVINE, COMMERCIAL BAIL BONDING: A
COMPARISON OF COMMON LAW ALTERNATIVES 15 (1991) (“[O]nly one country,
the Philippines, has adopted a commercial bail bonding system similar to the
American system.”). Some common law countries have even made profiting
from posting another’s bail a crime. Id. However, in the United States, as the
country grew through the 1800s, professional bondspersons took over the role
that friends and family had once filled, returning defendants to court if they
failed to appear. See Rebecca B. Fisher, The History of American Bounty
Hunting as a Study in Stunted Legal Growth, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 199, 208 (2009) (“[I]t was no longer sensible to insist on the
personalized surety system, as people lived in communities in which their
neighbors were strangers and their families were often in other states or other
countries.”). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the bondsperson’s
power, based in contract, to return the accused to court in Taylor v. Taintor, 83
U.S. 366 (1872). Id. at 209.
48
See THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1, 4 (2007). “In
the United States, the use of commercial bail bonds is rising, and they became
the most popular form of pretrial release in 1998. More than 40 percent of
felony defendants released before trial paid a bail bond company in 2004, up
from 24 percent a decade earlier, according to the Justice Department.” Liptak,
supra note 29.
49
See infra discussion accompanying notes 51–57, 103, 128, 145, 152–55.
50
See Peggy M. Tobolowsky & James F. Quinn, Pretrial Release in the
1990s: Texas Takes Another Look at Nonfinancial Release Conditions, 19 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 267, 279 n.51 (1993) (explaining that
some reformers feel that bailing defendants out directly “would only perpetuate
the reliance on financial conditions of release”).
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Bail Fund Organizing Manual, Marc Mauer addresses this point.51
“[W]hy then did we start a bail fund that accepted the existence of
the money bail system?” he asks; “[b]ecause it’s there.”52
With that view in mind, this Note contrasts two efforts to
combat the inequities of the pretrial process by working through
New York’s bail system,53 and discusses one of these efforts in
relation to concerns that were raised in the summer of 2009 by a
Bronx County Supreme Court judge in People v. Miranda.54 The
earlier effort, the Vera Institute of Justice’s (“Vera’s”) nonprofit,
licensed bail bond agencies, was a collaborative experiment
intended to assist certain high-risk defendants by posting their bail
pretrial in exchange for their agreement to abide by a strict
supervised release program.55 The second, more recent effort is
called the Bronx Freedom Fund (the “Freedom Fund”), a nonprofit
bail fund set up by the Bronx Defenders.56 It was also developed to
assume responsibility for the pretrial release of certain defendants
who would otherwise face pretrial incarceration simply because
they could not afford bail.57 While the Freedom Fund’s model is
very different from the Bronx agency that Vera closed in 1994,58
the challenges that Vera faced may help to explain why the
relatively modest idea of a bail fund could more cost-effectively
help a greater number of indigent pretrial detainees. However, in
rejecting bail that had been posted by the Freedom Fund on the
grounds that the organization was operating as an unlicensed bail
51

MARC MAUER, BAIL OUT: THE COMMUNITY BAIL FUND ORGANIZING
MANUAL 2 (1980) (writing about the American Friends Service Committee’s
Washtenaw Community Bail Fund in Ann Arbor, Michigan).
52
Id. at 5. “Until the time when we are able to change the money bail
system, people will still be suffering . . . and languishing in jail. . . . [B]y
demonstrating that a citizens’ group can get involved in the bail process, we
hoped to show that bail bondsmen were not essential to the system.” Id.
53
See discussion infra Parts II–III.
54
See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009) (rejecting bail posted by the Bronx
Freedom Fund on legal and policy grounds).
55
See discussion infra Part II.
56
See discussion infra Part III.
57
See infra text accompanying notes 128–29.
58
See infra text accompanying notes 181–91 (comparing the Freedom
Fund with Vera’s bail bond agencies).
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bond business under New York’s Insurance Law,59 the Bronx
court, in People v. Miranda, raised concerns about the Freedom
Fund’s methods and its connection with the Bronx Defenders.60
Part I of this Note will describe the significance of the pretrial
period to accused individuals, along with some of the early efforts
to make the pretrial system more equitable and the limits of those
efforts. Part II will discuss Vera’s bail bond agencies, which
attempted to assist a high-risk portion of the pretrial population.
Part III analyzes the policy concerns that the Bronx court raised in
People v. Miranda61 and discusses why certain aspects of the
Freedom Fund’s model, some of which were disapproved by the
court, could allow it to perform well in the Bronx, where Vera’s
bail bond agency did not. This Note concludes that the court’s
concern regarding the criteria employed by the Freedom Fund to
select defendants is one that might be addressed effectively by a
bail fund through careful structuring and a stricter client selection
process. In order to win judicial support, a bail fund may need to
set firmer criteria to guide its determination to post bail at no
expense to its clients. This is perhaps especially so where the fund
shares a connection to a particular defense organization—a
relationship that might give rise to more judicial concern.
I. SIGNIFICANCE AND BACKGROUND OF THE MOVEMENT TO
REFORM OUR PRETRIAL SYSTEM
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the
pretrial stage is the “most critical period” for an accused to prepare
a defense.62 Research shows that individuals who are incarcerated
pretrial regularly receive more severe sentences than defendants
who are released on recognizance63 or affordable bail.64 Even
59

Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *1, *10.
See generally id.
61
Id.
62
See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The
Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 1, 2
(1998) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
63
Release on recognizance means that a defendant is released based on his
or her personal promise to return to court as required. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 500.10(2) (McKinney 2009) (“A court releases a principal on his own
60
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“affordable bail” may be out of reach for an indigent defendant.65
The problem the indigent defendant faces is compounded when, as
a result of pretrial incarceration, he or she may be exposed to the
possibility of a more severe case outcome.66 Moreover, indigent
defendants who are incarcerated pretrial frequently would not have
had to serve any extended time in jail but for their inability to post
bail.67 One study reported that forty-eight percent of nonfelony
defendants who were detained pretrial were ultimately acquitted,
had their cases dismissed, or received noncustodial sentences.68
That period of pretrial detention can last for months.69 This time
spent in jail not only hinders the accused’s defense, it disrupts
work, school, social relationships, and any physical or
psychological treatment.70 Because some defendants are unable to
post bail, but are desperate to avoid incarceration, they may plead
guilty to crimes they did not commit, or to charges that might
recognizance when, having acquired control over his person, it permits him to be
at liberty during the pendency of the criminal action or proceeding involved
upon condition that he will appear thereat whenever his attendance may be
required and will at all times render himself amenable to the orders and
processes of the court.”).
64
Colbert, supra note 62, at 13. Some researchers have hypothesized that it
is the probable case outcome that affects a judge’s decision to remand or set
bail. Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 1. However, recent research on
New York City defendants supports the hypothesis that pretrial detention does
have a negative impact on both felony and nonfelony case outcomes. Id. at 7;
Mary T. Phillips, Research Brief No. 18: Bail, Detention, & Felony Case
Outcomes, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 5–7 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief18.pdf [hereinafter Research Brief No.
18].
65
See sources cited supra notes 28, 30.
66
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
67
Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 7.
68
Id. A similar result was found for the felony sample, where “[n]early half
of the detained . . . were either not convicted (27%) or received a noncustodial
sentence (19%).” Research Brief No. 18, supra note 64, at 7.
69
E.g., Colbert, supra note 62, at 4 (“[The] pretrial prison system [is]
bursting at its seams with poor people awaiting trial.”); Read More, BRONX
FREEDOM FUND, http://www.bronxfreedomfund.org/read-more.html (last visited
Sept. 15, 2010).
70
Colbert, supra note 62, at 43; Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra
note 69.
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otherwise be lessened or dropped.71 The consequences of the
criminal record and possible lengthy probation that results from
such a plea can be severe, threatening job prospects, leading to loss
of public benefits, disrupting families, and affecting immigration
status.72 The costs of pretrial detention on taxpayers are
substantial;73 the costs on the defendants and their families may be
devastating.74
In 1961, the Vera Institute of Justice, through the Manhattan
Bail Project, set out to show that rather than depending on financial
bail to ensure a defendant’s appearance in court, the strength of a
defendant’s community ties could serve as a strong basis for
release on recognizance,75 a method commonly known as ROR.
The success of Vera’s method,76 which involved verifying
defendants’ background information and assigning a numerical

71

See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial,
117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2468, 2491–93, 2493 n.116, 2540 (2004); Read More,
BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69. The undue pressure that pretrial
detention can put on a defendant to plead guilty can be particularly severe for
those accused of less serious offenses. Research Brief No. 14, supra note 30, at 7
(“A defendant facing a conditional discharge, a fine, or a sentence of time
served—unlike a defendant facing serious jail or prison time—can gain
immediate release by pleading guilty. This creates a strong incentive to do so.”).
72
See generally Collateral Consequences of Criminal Charges: New York
State, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fourcs/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (providing information and links to other resources
concerning collateral consequences in New York).
73
See, e.g., source cited supra note 46; see also Basic Prison and Jail Fact
Sheet, CORR. ASS’N OF N.Y. (Mar. 2006), http://www.correctionalassociation.
org/publications/download/pvp/factsheets/basic_prison_fact_2006.pdf (“It costs
the city about $59,900 a year to keep an inmate in a New York City Jail.”)
(emphasis removed); Colbert, supra note 62, at 42.
74
See supra text accompanying notes 70–72.
75
A Short History of Vera’s Work on the Judicial Process, VERA INST. OF
JUSTICE, 2 (June 2003), http://www.vera.org/download?file=403/hist_summ_
judicial_process.pdf [hereinafter VERA 2003].
76
Id. (“[T]he experimental group released on nothing more than their
promise to return had twice the appearance rate of those released on bail. The
project also saved more than $1 million in the correction department’s budget.”);
see also Don Oberdorfer, The Bail-Bond Scandal, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
June 20, 1964, at 66, 66–67 (describing the positive impact of Vera’s efforts).
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score for judicial reference, helped lead to national reform.77 These
pretrial services comprised a mechanism upon which judges could
rely to make more informed release decisions.78 Because it is time
consuming and somewhat unreliable for a judge to make a detailed
inquiry into a defendant’s background at an initial appearance,
judges often depend on straightforward criteria when making their
bail determination.79 An absence of such criteria and an overall
lack of available information can contribute to inconsistent
decision making.80 That reality prompted bail projects like Vera’s,
which were designed to accurately assess defendants’ backgrounds
and community ties for the purpose of developing release
recommendations.81 One of the objectives of this movement was to
“incorporate explicit, objective criteria into pretrial decision
making . . . with the [aim of] . . . minimizing the disparate
outcomes resulting from arbitrary and subjective decisions.”82
In New York City, Vera’s efforts led to the creation of the
CJA, a nonprofit corporation that exists today under contract with
the city.83 Through personal interviews, CJA collects information
relating to criminal court defendants’ employment, residency,
family status, prior convictions, and appearance history, however,
not all of the information is used to calculate the objective score
that forms the basis of CJA’s release recommendation.84 Following
77

See VERA 2003, supra note 75, at 2 (referring to the federal Bail Reform
Act of 1966). Caleb Foote credited Vera’s “remarkable reform efforts” with
sparking change in the area of bail. See CALEB FOOTE ET AL., STUDIES ON BAIL,
at v (Caleb Foote ed., 1966).
78
Oberdorfer, supra note 76, at 66 (explaining that while judges had the
power to release defendants without bail, they rarely did so because they lacked
sufficient information upon which to base that determination).
79
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.1(b) (3d ed. West 2008).
80
See Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al., The Development & Validation of
a Pretrial Screening Tool, 72 FED. PROBATION 2, 3 (2008).
81
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 79, § 12.1(b).
82
Lowenkamp et al., supra note 80, at 3.
83
About the Agency, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUST. AGENCY, INC., http://www.nycja.
org/about/about.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). The agency was originally
established in 1973 as the Pretrial Services Agency and today exists under
contract with New York City’s Office of the Coordinator for Criminal Justice.
Id.
84
See Annual Report 2008, supra note 15, at 5, 13. Much of the
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the current mandate of New York’s Criminal Procedure Law,85
CJA has made release recommendations based on what the agency
understands to reflect a defendant’s risk of flight, rather than
community safety concerns.86 Nonetheless, in what CJA described
as a “source of some frustration,” research completed before 2005
indicated that prosecutors’ bail requests were the only significant
predictor of bail amount, and a potent factor in ROR
determinations.87 Because other CJA research shows that
prosecutors’ bail requests are generally informed by factors other
than likelihood of court appearance, bail determinations are
probably based upon community safety and other concerns despite
the mandate of the statute.88 Some judges acknowledged to CJA
that they have disregarded the agency’s recommendation because it
failed to reflect factors they feel are important.89 In June of 2003,
two criminal history elements were added to CJA’s adult
information that is not used to calculate the objective score is used for research
purposes or to assess a defendant’s social service needs. See id. at 5. To
determine whether an adult defendant is categorized as low risk, moderate risk,
high risk, or no recommendation, points are awarded or subtracted for (i) a
working telephone number, (ii) a New York City area address, (iii) full time
employment, school, or training program, (iv) someone expected at arraignment,
(v) any open cases, and (vi) any prior bench warrants. See id. CJA’s most recent
available annual report, from 2008, shows that sixty-five percent of defendants
whose cases were not disposed of at arraignment (which was about half of all
cases), were released on recognizance and bail was set for thirty-four percent.
Id. at 16. The remaining one percent was remanded without bail. Id.
85
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2) (McKinney 2009).
86
Qudsia Siddiqi, Research Brief No. 19: Pretrial Failure Among New
York City Defendants, N.Y.C. CRIM. JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 1, 7 (Jan. 2009),
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief19.pdf.
87
Mary T. Phillips, Research Brief No. 9: Prosecutors’ Bail Requests and
the CJA Recommendation: What Do They Tell the Judge?, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., 2 (Aug. 2005), http://www.cjareports.org/reports/brief9.
pdf [hereinafter Research Brief No. 9].
88
See id. at 7.
89
Factors Part 1, supra note 19, at 48. Since that time, some factors have
been changed to better reflect judicial concerns. See id. In 2008, of those
defendants who CJA recommended for ROR, eighty-one percent were granted
it. Annual Report 2008, supra note 15, at 19. On the other hand, forty-three
percent of defendants who were not recommended for release by CJA were
granted ROR. Id.
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recommendation system—whether the defendant has (1) any prior
bench warrants or (2) open cases90—but CJA does not consider
offense type or severity in its recommendation.91 More judges may
now give weight to CJA’s score in light of the changes the agency
made to their objective criteria.92 But the inconsistent use of CJA’s
recommendations highlights the fact that release and bail-setting
decisions are judicial determinations.93 If judicial opinion is not
aligned with the agency’s assessment criteria, the effect of the
service is diluted. A similar result occurs when judges do not
exercise their statutorily granted discretion to set bail in less
burdensome forms.94 Statutory authority for setting less onerous
types of bail, such as unsecured bonds,95 makes little difference if
judges rarely exercise those options.

90

Research Brief No. 9, supra note 87, at 3.
See id. at 7.
92
See Factors Part 1, supra note 19, at 48.
93
See John S. Goldkamp, Judicial Responsibility for Pretrial Release
Decisionmaking and the Information Role of Pretrial Services, 57 FED.
PROBATION 28, 29 (1993) [hereinafter Judicial Responsibility].
94
See Making Bail in New York City, supra note 9, at 3; see also Research
Brief No. 18, supra note 64, at 7 (“More use could be made of cash alternatives
and rarely used bail options such as personal recognizance bonds for . . . lowand medium-risk defendants if ROR is not appropriate.”); Peter A. Crusco,
Uncovering Tainted Bail, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 20, 2004, at 4, col. 4 (“New York
gives preferential treatment to insurance company bail bonds as compared to the
other types of statutory bail.”); Martha Rayner, Conference Report: New York
City’s Criminal Courts: Are We Achieving Justice?, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1023, 1046 (2004) (observing that more research should be done to “explore the
feasibility of the increased use of non-traditional, though statutorily based, bail
options, such as secured and unsecured bonds”).
95
See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 500.10, 520.10 (McKinney 2009); see
also CRIM. PROC. § 520.10 cmt. (“By amendment in 1972, the Legislature
reversed [the] presumption so that now . . . when the court fails to specify, the
defendant may post unsecured bail in the least onerous form—i.e., an unsecured
surety bond or an appearance bond secured only by the defendant’s promise to
pay. However it is doubtful that the defendant would receive this largess by
oversight, since the court must approve the form in which the bail is posted prior
to release of the principal.”) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.40).
91
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II. A NEW TACTIC: VERA’S BAIL BOND AGENCIES
While Vera’s efforts did spur the movement toward more
nonfinancial pretrial release,96 the community ties model has a
somewhat obvious limit. Those who lack financial resources
frequently lack strong community ties; the two characteristics are
often directly related.97
[The model] had little relevance to the type of person most
commonly processed by the criminal courts. These
defendants often had no jobs, no good record of
employment, no stable residence, no upstanding
community members to vouch for their reliability, and little
education. In short, just as they were unlikely to be able to
post very low amounts of cash bail, they were also unlikely
to receive high community-ties ratings to earn
recommendations for release on personal recognizance
(nonfinancial release).98
Vera undoubtedly recognized this problem and in the mid1980s began to focus its pretrial efforts on a different segment of
the defendant population.99 From 1987 to 1994, Vera established
three nonprofit bail bond agencies to post bond at no cost for
certain defendants who had been denied ROR.100 In exchange,
each defendant signed a contract agreeing to take part in an
intensive pretrial supervision program, which involved daily
physical monitoring of participants.101 The intensive supervision
96

See CLARK & HENRY, supra note 42, at 1 (“[H]undreds of pretrial
programs have been established in rural, suburban, and urban jurisdictions.”).
97
See, e.g., PERSONAL LIBERTY, supra note 17, at vii.
98
Id.
99
See Christopher Stone, Forward to Bail Bond Supervision in Three
Counties, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE (Aug. 1995), http://www.vera.org/download?
file=73/bailbond.pdf.
100
Id.
101
Id.; Bail Bond Supervision in Three Counties, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, 1,
23
(Aug.
1995),
http://www.vera.org/download?file=73/bailbond.pdf
[hereinafter VERA 1995] (“Vera’s bail bond supervision projects [were] among
the most intensive community supervision programs ever attempted.”); VERA
2003, supra note 75, at 3 (“[The program involved] an initial period in a 24-hour
residence, drug testing, curfews, unannounced home visits, and job monitoring.
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was intended both to deter misconduct and to give staff notice if
there was reason to return a participant to jail.102 In order to post
bonds and to exercise this authority, some staff became licensed
bail bond agents.103 For the population that the agencies were
working with, the possibility of returning a defendant to custody
was important for the message it sent to both the defendant and the
Department of Correction—that “the program was serious about
controlling behavior and preserving community safety.”104
Vera sought to create “a pretrial supervision program so good
that it [could] compete with jail—one that [could] virtually
guarantee that defendants under supervision [would] neither
abscond nor commit new crimes.”105 This kind of supervised
release as an alternative to pretrial detention raises some concerns.
One of the most troubling aspects of pretrial detention is that it in
effect punishes a defendant before he or she has been convicted of
a crime.106 When, for a defendant who cannot afford bail, the
alternative to pretrial incarceration is intensive supervised release,
that defendant’s freedom is still restricted in a way that it would
not have been if the defendant had been able to post bail.107 Even
when participants voluntarily agree to comply with this type of
program, it is questionable whether a detained person meaningfully
consents to the restrictive conditions the program imposes when he
or she has so few alternatives.108 On the other hand, for the
population of “high-risk” defendants with whom Vera was
Most important, the defendants agreed that the agency could return them to jail
if they failed to comply.”).
102
Stone, supra note 99.
103
Id.
104
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 7.
105
Stone, supra note 99.
106
See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (describing consequences
of pretrial detention).
107
See supra note 101 (describing strict restrictions on participants’ daily
lives).
108
For a discussion of the constitutional issues that are raised by this
problem and the “tension created when an arrested person is asked to chose
between sacrificing the privacy rights he normally enjoys . . . and forgoing an
opportunity to avoid indefinite pretrial detention” in the federal context, see
generally Melanie D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to
Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, 92 IOWA L. REV. 159 (2006).
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working,109 this kind of supervision afforded participants an
opportunity not just to avoid pretrial detention, but also to connect
with treatment and training programs and, most importantly, to
demonstrate to the judge that, if convicted, a jail sentence would be
unnecessary.110 Still, Vera reported that “[i]n some cases, the
Bronx Bail Bond Agency was supervising defendants long after
they would have been released from jail had they not been bailed
out by the agency.”111
Apart from liberty and due process concerns,112 the length of
time that participants were subject to supervision also posed
practical difficulties.113 The release contracts included a detailed
schedule of all required and permitted activities; minor breaches of
the contract led to even more restrictions.114 Particularly in the
Bronx, where the period of supervision was especially long,
defendants’ commitment to their rigid schedules waned over the
lengthy pretrial period.115 But it was one of Vera’s goals to target
109

Some participants were homeless, many had criminal records, and most
had substance abuse problems. VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 5.
110
See Stone, supra note 99. One author has observed:
[I]f programs of supervised release were truly alternatives to pretrial
custody, and did not result in widening the net so as to control
defendants who previously would not have even been detained, and if
defendants in the supervised programs can have their cases dismissed
without prejudice if they successfully complete them, the idea might be
worth exploring. None of that will erase the fact, however, that
significant intrusions into citizen’s lives are being made previous to
trial and without criminal convictions. This fact might be
insurmountable for those who would design new alternatives in pretrial
release today.
Candace McCoy, Tribute, Caleb Was Right: Pretrial Decisions Determine
Mostly Everything, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 135, 144–45 (2007).
111
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 21.
112
See generally Wilson, supra note 108.
113
See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 20.
114
Id. at 6.
115
Id. at 20 (“The Bronx District Attorney’s office proved unwilling to
reward compliant defendants with probation. As a result, defendants in the
program delayed the disposition of their cases . . . . Extending the duration of
supervision dramatically increased the surrender rate . . . . As people became
more frustrated by what seemed to be a pointless as well as endless situation,
they broke more and more rules.”).
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people who “would represent a net savings in corrections
resources.”116 To that end, Vera offered to supervise defendants
who were likely to be detained for at least ninety days before trial
and who were eligible for probation.117 That way, space was not
only saved pretrial, but when defendants successfully complied
with pretrial supervision they were more likely to receive
probation at sentencing.118 Because supervising defendants so
closely cost as much as incarceration, it was the prospect of
achieving a non-jail sentence that could make the largely
government-funded program cost-effective.119 What Vera’s reports
make fairly clear is that its goal was not to get as many individuals
out of jail as possible.120 Vera was working with the city to craft an
alternative to pretrial incarceration for people who were unlikely to
benefit from the movement toward personal recognizance.121
Vera’s Bail Bond Agencies reached out to a population of
116

Id. at 1.
Id. Vera’s 1995 report on the projects explains that “[s]imply put, it
doesn’t save money to remove people from jail who later receive jail sentences
because pretrial detention is deducted from the sentence.” Id. at 3. This
statement may not account for the possibility that removing people who are
ineligible for probation from jail could result in acquittal, dismissal, or a shorter
jail sentence overall. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing
evidence of more favorable case outcomes when defendants are released
pretrial). Vera also observed that “[r]eleasing 100 defendants, who each would
have spent two days in jail, saves 200 bed days; releasing two people, who each
would have spent 100 days in jail, conserves the same amount of space.” VERA
1995, supra note 101, at 3. If Vera had targeted short-term detainees it
presumably would have been able to assist more individuals. This alternative
approach would have required supervising a greater number of defendants, but
each individual would probably have required less oversight because the
relationship between the defendant and project staff would have less time to
become strained. On the other hand, long-term detainees stand to gain the most
when supervision is effective.
118
Stone, supra note 99 (“[A] defendant’s good behavior and achievements
while under supervision helped persuade prosecutors and judges to impose a
sentence of probation.”); VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 2.
119
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 5 (stating that Vera’s model was “as
expensive as jail”).
120
See supra discussion accompanying notes 114–19.
121
See supra text accompanying notes 97–98 (noting that some defendants
would not benefit from the ROR movement).
117
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defendants who faced extreme challenges.122 Even in Nassau
County, twenty-seven percent of participants in the bail project
were surrendered and four percent were rearrested.123 In the Bronx,
too many people had to be surrendered for the program to be
workable124 and so the Bronx agency was closed in 1994.125 In
2007, another group of advocates launched a different project in
the Bronx, with different goals and on a more modest scale.
III. THE BRONX FREEDOM FUND
The Bronx Defenders is a public defenders practice that, in
addition to providing indigent defense, works to address the
various civil and social service needs of their clients.126 Many of
the Bronx Defenders’ indigent clients cannot afford even very low
bail.127 After years of seeing clients in jail pretrial, sometimes for
lack of even a few hundred dollars, and witnessing many plead
122

VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 5.
Id. at 4 n.6. Two percent of Nassau participants absconded. Id. The
agencies in Nassau County, New York and Essex County, New Jersey
ultimately lost no bonds and were incorporated into nonprofit organizations with
county contracts. VERA 2003, supra note 75, at 3. Vera reported that the Nassau
County project was transferred to the Education and Assistance Corporation in
1992 and the Essex County project was transferred to Volunteers of America in
1993. Id. at 13.
124
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 19–21. In the Bronx, forty-nine percent
of participants were surrendered, id. at 7, twelve percent were rearrested, and
five percent absconded. Id. at 15.
125
VERA 2003, supra note 75, at 3.
126
Advocacy for Clients, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.
org/our-work/advocacy-for-clients (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). This “holistic”
approach is based on the experience that most of their clients’ criminal cases are
symptoms of more complicated and long-term problems. See id.; see also We
Stabilize Lives Through Civil Advocacy, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronx
defenders.org/our-work/we-stabilize-lives-through-civil-advocacy (last visited
Sept. 15, 2010) (describing provision of services for issues such as employment,
housing, health, and addiction).
127
Robin Steinberg & Zoë Towns, The Bronx Freedom Fund: A Model
Bail Fund, CORNERSTONE (Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, Washington,
D.C.), Jan.–Apr. 2009, at 21; Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69
(“More than half of the Bronx defendants who have bail set remain behind bars
for their entire pretrial period.”).
123
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guilty just to avoid that time in jail, the Bronx Defenders set up a
project called the Bronx Freedom Fund—a revolving bail fund that
would provide bail at no cost to clients who met certain criteria.128
The hope of the project was that those defendants would be able to
achieve a more favorable result in their criminal matter and avoid
the severe consequences of pretrial detention, while obtaining
social services earlier in the process.129 The Bronx Freedom Fund’s
website states that since opening in 2007, ninety-three percent of
the defendants who benefited from the fund made all of their court
appearances and over fifty percent of cases “were dismissed or
resulted in a non-criminal disposition.”130 A project of this kind
depends on a high success rate because when a case closes with the
defendant having made all court appearances, bail is returned and
the fund is replenished—hence the revolving nature of the fund.131
By June of 2009, the Bronx Freedom Fund had posted bail for
approximately 130 indigent clients.132 However, that same month a
judge in Bronx County Supreme Court rejected bail that had been
posted for a defendant by the Freedom Fund.133 In an unreported
decision, People v. Miranda, the court found that the Bronx
Freedom Fund had “become a ‘bail bond business’ as well as an
‘insurance business’ as defined in Insurance Law § 6801 [and,

128

See Steinberg & Towns, supra note 127, at 21; Read More, BRONX
FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69. See also infra notes 252–53 and accompanying
text (discussing the criteria used).
129
See Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69.
130
Id. But see People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at
*10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009) (“[The Freedom Fund] does
not apparently keep statistics about whether a judge agreed to stay the issuance
of a warrant upon request of the Bronx Defenders’ attorney . . . and the District
Attorney’s Office challenges the validity of this statistic.”).
131
Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69; see also What You
Should Know Before You Pay Bail, supra note 21 (explaining the process for
return of bail funds by the Department of Finance and that pursuant to section
99-m of the General Municipal Law, the Department will retain a three percent
fee when a case ends with a conviction).
132
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 (finding that from the time of its
incorporation to the time of the decision, bail had been posted for approximately
130 Bronx Defenders’ clients).
133
Id. at *1.
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therefore], it had to be licensed.”134 In consequence, the court
rejected the bail posted for the Bronx Defenders’ client “on both
legal and public policy grounds.”135
In defining a “bail bond business,” section 6801(a)(1) of the
New York Insurance Law states that:
[a]ny person, firm or corporation in any court having
criminal jurisdiction or in any criminal action or proceeding
who shall for another deposit money or property as bail . . .
who within a period of one month prior thereto shall have
made such a deposit or given such bail in more than two
cases not arising out of the same transaction shall be
deemed to be doing a bail bond business and doing an
insurance business as defined in article eleven of this
chapter.136
New York’s law further provides that no person or entity shall
engage in such business unless licensed to do so.137 In People v.
Miranda, the Bronx County Supreme Court found that the Bronx
Freedom Fund had posted bail in eight cases within the thirty day
period prior to posting bail for the defendant.138 Therefore, the
court determined, the organization was operating as a bail bond
business and an insurance business under the law and it had to be
licensed.139 The Miranda court reasoned that the violation cast the
validity of the bail into question.140
To call a charitable bail fund a bail bond business is
counterintuitive. The term “bail bond business” suggests that the
person or entity posting bail must intend to profit from the
undertaking. But elsewhere the insurance law provides that “the
fact that no profit is derived from the making of insurance
contracts, agreements or transactions, or that no separate or direct
134

Id.
Id.
136
N.Y. INS. LAW § 6801(a)(1) (McKinney 2009).
137
Id. § 6801(b)(1) (“No person, firm or corporation shall in this state do
an insurance business or a bail bond business as defined in subsection (a) of this
section unless authorized by a license issued and in force as provided under
article eleven of this chapter.”).
138
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *11.
139
Id.
140
Id.
135
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consideration is received therefor, shall not be deemed
conclusively to show that the making thereof does not constitute
the doing of an insurance business.”141 Nor is the definition of
“bail bond business” limited to those posting bond, as opposed to
those “deposit[ing] money or property as bail.”142 This definition
could be interpreted expansively enough to require licensing of
almost any person or entity that regularly posts bail.143
However, bail funds are not an unknown phenomenon in New
York.144 The Bronx court acknowledged that “[i]n New York
State, several organizations, including the United Way of
Tompkins County, which has loaned bail money to defendants, and
Catholic Charities of Onondaga County, which posted half the bail,
have administered bail funds with money appropriated by the local
county legislatures.”145 The Bronx Freedom Fund’s counsel
suggested, reasonably, that if such organizations regularly post
bail, apparently with local legislative sanction, then it too should
be permitted to post cash bail without being subject to the licensing
requirement of the insurance law.146 The Freedom Fund pointed to
section 4522(a)(3) of the New York Insurance Law,147 which
exempts from the requirements of the insurance law, particularly
licensing requirements, “[o]rganizations of a religious, charitable,
benevolent or fraternal character, which are not organized or
maintained primarily for the purpose of providing insurance

141

N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(b)(4) (McKinney 2009).
See supra note 136 and accompanying text (defining “bail bond
business”).
143
The law requiring licensing of bondspersons does explicitly provide a
limited exception for insurers authorized to issue policies of motor vehicle and
aircraft insurance who “undertake[] to pay . . . the cost of bail bonds required of
the insured because of accident or asserted traffic law violations arising out of
the use of a vehicle insured under the terms of the policy.” N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 6802(o) (McKinney 2009).
144
See infra notes 145, 154 and accompanying text.
145
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *10. Opportunities, Alternatives, and
Resources of Tompkins County Inc., which administers a Bail Funds Program
with public and private money is an independent nonprofit agency. See OAR,
http://www.oartompkins.com/index.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
146
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *15 n.23.
147
Id. at *2.
142

330

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

benefits.”148 The court determined that despite the charitable nature
of the Freedom Fund,149 since it was “organized [and] maintained
primarily for the purpose of providing”150 bail, the exemption did
not apply.151
Though the Miranda decision is not binding on other courts, its
interpretation of the insurance law raises interesting questions.
Aside from charitable purposes, bail funds have historical and
political significance. Bail funds have been utilized by suppressed
groups, including civil rights activists and communists.152 In the
1960s, bail funds played an instrumental role in the civil rights
movement.153 During the 1970s, Professor Angela Y. Davis, a
feminist and human rights activist, was involved in organizing a
bail fund for sex workers in New York’s Women’s House of

148

N.Y. INS. LAW § 4522(a)(3) (McKinney 2009).
The Bronx Freedom Fund’s certificate of incorporation, filed with the
Secretary of State, indicates that the fund operates for “charitable purposes.”
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *4.
150
INS. LAW § 4522(a)(3).
151
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *15. According to the opinion, at some
point counsel for the Bronx Freedom Fund acknowledged on the record that the
exemption did not apply to the nonprofit, despite earlier advice from another law
firm to the contrary. Id. at *3. Subsequently, the Freedom Fund invoked the
argument that only the Commissioner of Insurance could determine whether an
entity was exempt from licensure. Id. at *13.
152
See, for example, Comment, Communists and the Right to Bail, 20 U.
CHI. L. REV. 330, 342 (1952–1953), for a discussion of a series of cases in
which federal courts rejected bail posted for communist defendants by the Civil
Rights Congress and proposing that although the Second Circuit rejected the bail
because the bail fund’s trustees had indicated a disregard for their duties as
sureties, “[t]he court might have argued that bail funds donated to the surety by
other persons without consideration provide no incentive to produce the
accused, since the surety bears no risk of loss.” See also United States v. Flynn,
190 F.2d 672, 673 (2d Cir. 1951) (per curiam) (discussing grounds for rejecting
bail posted by the Bail Fund of the Civil Rights Congress of New York).
153
See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Essay, Kennedy, King,
Shuttlesworth and Walker: The Events Leading to the Introduction of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 645, 657, 660 (1995) (explaining that
volunteers for demonstrations and sit-ins in Birmingham had been promised
“that they would have to spend only a few days in jail before being bailed out[,]”
but that the Alabama legislature manipulated statutory bail limits to deplete the
fund).
149
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Detention.154 In Ann Arbor, Michigan, in the 1970s, a Quaker
organization’s bail fund aimed more broadly to “impact . . . the
criminal justice system itself by laying the groundwork for social
change [to] create a more just and equitable system . . . .”155 Under
New York’s expansive definition, some such efforts could
constitute “bail bond businesses,” giving courts statutory grounds
to reject the bail. Since the definition only applies to people or
entities that have posted bail in “more than two cases not arising
out of the same transaction,”156 it could exclude certain funds with
a political bent, where money is used to bail out a group of
demonstrators.157 The Bronx court’s view of the matter put the
Bronx Freedom Fund, a nonprofit corporation created to regularly
bail out indigent defendants,158 in a somewhat unique situation:
although a charity, it fit the insurance law’s definition of “bail
bond business.”159 The definition does leave open the option of
posting bail no more than twice within a thirty day period in order
to stay outside the reaches of the licensing requirement.160
This begs the question of whether it would be possible for a
revolving bail fund to be licensed so that it would not have to work
in such a limited manner. New York law specifies that the
Insurance Department’s superintendent has the power to authorize
a fidelity and insurance company to conduct a bail bond business,
but that individuals shall not be licensed to engage in such a
business.161 Any agents of a licensed entity must be named as
sublicensees.162 This means that, in addition to passing a written
154

Siobhan Brooks, Symposium, Economic Justice for Sex Workers:
Interview, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 181, 182 (1999).
155
See MAUER, supra note 51, at 2–3.
156
N.Y. INS. LAW § 6801(a)(1) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added).
157
See source cited supra note 153 and accompanying text (noting
usefulness of bail funds to the civil rights movement).
158
See supra note 149 (regarding the Freedom Fund’s certificate of
incorporation).
159
See INS. § 6801(a)(1) (defining “bail bond business”).
160
See id.
161
Id. § 6801(b)(2).
162
Id. § 6802(d). Sublicensees are authorized at the superintendent’s
discretion. Id. § 6802(c). It is a misdemeanor for any person or entity to solicit,
negotiate, or effect a deposit or bail bond for an insurer engaged in a bail bond
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test “appropriate to the doing of a bail bond business,”163 and
satisfying requirements of “trustworthiness and competence”164
and “good character and reputation,”165 a bail fund could
theoretically contract with an agent of a licensed fidelity and
insurance company in order to run a bail bond business.166 This is
what the Vera Institute’s bail bond agencies had to do in order to
post bond.167 However, even for the Vera Institute of Justice,
which received government funding168 and whose influence
sparked a national reform movement,169 getting licensed was a
challenge.170 It was not easy for Vera to find a company willing to
work with them,171 and once it had, the company charged a fee for
every bond posted.172 But the premiums charged on each bond pale
business without being licensed. Id. § 6802(a).
163
Id. § 6802(h). In a city with a population exceeding one hundred
seventy-five thousand, the examination may cover “the pertinent provisions of
the criminal procedure law and the pertinent rules and practices of the courts and
district attorneys’ offices within the area of the applicant’s proposed
operations.” Id. For additional requirements of licensees in such cities, see id.
§ 6803(a).
164
Id. § 6802(e) (“Before the issuance of a license every applicant shall
satisfy the superintendent as to his trustworthiness and competence . . . .”).
165
Id. § 6802(g) (“Every applicant . . . shall file . . . written evidence by
those who know his character and reputation and by such other proof as the
superintendent may require, including his fingerprints, that he is a person of
good character and reputation and has never been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude or of any crime.”).
166
For insurance companies that have agents licensed in New York, see
Bail Bonds Active Agent Listing, supra note 8.
167
In order to become licensed, Vera’s bail bond agencies worked with
Bail USA, Inc., then managing agents for American Bankers Insurance
Company. E-mail from Susan Rai, Special Counsel, The Vera Inst. of Justice, to
author (Oct. 22, 2009, 11:05 EST) (on file with author).
168
The copyright page of Vera’s 1995 report on its bail bond supervision
programs notes that the project received partial funding from both New York
City and New York State. See VERA 1995, supra note 101.
169
See supra discussion accompanying notes 75–84 (discussing the
Manhattan Bail Project and creation of the CJA).
170
Telephone Interview with Susan Rai, Special Counsel, The Vera Inst. of
Justice (Oct. 22, 2009).
171
Id.
172
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 28 (listing a fee of one and one half
percent on each bond posted).
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in comparison to the other expenses that such an arrangement
could cost. Aside from the fees associated with the licensing
process,173 licensing would require compliance with the demands
and expectations of the insurance company.174 Vera’s licensed
projects were heavily staffed175 and funded,176 in part to meet those
demands, and also to implement one of “the most intensive
community supervision programs ever attempted.”177 As expensive
as Vera’s projects were, today they could be even more so.
Effective 2001, New York amended article 7 of the general
business law to regulate “bail enforcement agents,”178 defined to
include persons or entities “engage[ed] in the business of enforcing
the terms and conditions of a person’s release from custody . . .
including locating, apprehending and returning any such
person,”179 which Vera’s agencies certainly were.180 In view of the
173

Section 6802 of the Insurance Law provides for a yearly licensing fee of
twenty-five dollars for each applicant and each “proposed sublicensee” of such
applicant, N.Y. INS. LAW § 6802(f) (McKinney 2009), the administrative costs
of the required written examination, id. § 6802(i), and the filing of a “qualifying
bond” of five thousand dollars with the superintendant to insure against injury or
loss resulting from misconduct of the bail bond business. Id. § 6802(j).
174
For instance, Bail USA, Inc., agent of Seneca Insurance Company, Inc.,
provides on its website that in order for an agent application to be processed,
contract collateral must first be filed with their office. Licensing Regulations and
Requirements, BAIL USA, http://www.bailusa.net/learningCenter/sr_licensing
Regulations.php (follow “Collateral Guidelines” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 28,
2010). The form provides for minimum cash collateral of $25,000 or $50,000
property collateral, but notes that “[e]ach applicant is reviewed on an individual
basis.” Id. The fund would also have to comply with New York’s reporting
requirements. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 28.2 (2009).
175
Projects were usually staffed by a “director, an administrative assistant,
an intake coordinator, a jail screener, a support services coordinator, a
transitional counselor, and four release monitors. Two enforcement coordinators
oversaw community supervision in the three sites.” VERA 1995, supra note 101,
at 13.
176
See supra note 119 and accompanying text (discussing the cost of
Vera’s program).
177
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 23.
178
See 2000 N.Y. Sess. Laws Ch. 562 (A. 1432-B) (McKinney).
179
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 71 (1-a) (McKinney 2004). See also id. § 71 (4).
180
See supra text accompanying note 104 (describing importance of bail
enforcement for Vera’s projects). The new requirements include posting of a
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various financial burdens that stem from the requirements of the
insurance law, a bail fund is unlikely to have the financial means
or the powers of persuasion to contract with an entity engaged in
this for-profit industry. The important question from a policy
standpoint is whether the state should require licensing of a
nonprofit bail fund or whether the activities of such a fund should
be subject only to the judicial oversight that would apply if the
fund posted bail too infrequently to qualify as a “bail bond
business” under New York’s law.
The Vera Institute of Justice saw licensing as essential to its
bail bond agencies.181 In Vera’s view, the threat that project staff
might exercise their power under the bond agreement to arrest
participants and return them to the Department of Corrections
“helped the projects control individuals in structured and logical
ways.”182 Moreover, “the financial risk [of forfeiting the bonds]
focused program staff on the need for the principal’s strict
compliance.”183 A bail fund operates with that same element of
financial risk; if a defendant fails to appear in court, bail is
forfeited, the fund is not replenished and the project cannot be
sustained over time.184 That threat provides an incentive for the
fund to carefully select its clients. For Vera, the monitoring powers
of the licensed bondsperson were essential because the agencies
were purposefully choosing to work with higher risk defendants.185
For commercial bonds businesses the monitoring powers are
essential because the bondsperson’s profit motive leads him or her
to select clients with higher bail, which often corresponds to higher

$500,000 bond as a prerequisite to licensing. N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 74 (1)(b)
(McKinney 2010).
181
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 24 (“Vera’s planners, project directors,
and enforcement officers agree[d] that this power [was] essential to preventing
additional crime and ensuring that defendants [did] not evade court
proceedings.”).
182
Id. at 5 (observing additionally that participants “were not a naturally
compliant population”).
183
Id. at 24.
184
See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing revolving nature
of the Freedom Fund).
185
See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text (describing Vera’s
selection process and the rationale behind it).
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flight risk.186 But bondspersons do not solely rely on their powers
of arrest; rather, they employ a variety of ways to minimize the
risk of flight.187 Such practices include maintaining contact with
clients by phone, mail, and personal visits, as well as requiring
third parties (usually close to the defendant) to co-sign and put up
collateral for the defendant’s release.188 Especially for less serious
offenses, a missed court appearance is often simply a matter of
forgetfulness.189 Given the Freedom Fund’s reported success
rates,190 the project suggests that if a bail fund is motivated to
select lower-risk defendants, it can function successfully without
holding the threat of arrest over participants’ heads.191 The fact that
186

See Thomas H. Cohen, Commercial Surety Bail and the Problem of
Missed Court Appearances and Pretrial Detention 373 (3rd Annual Conference
on Empirical Legal Studies Papers, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130964## (“Higher bond amounts translate
into more profits for surety agents, meaning that the profit potential, rather than
flight risk, could be the primary driver behind who surety agents accept.”). This
is not to say that commercial bondspersons do not directly consider flight risk
when making their determination. “The power of surety agents to use their
absolute discretion in selecting which defendants to release should not be
understated.” Id. at 345–46. Queens bail bondsman, John Medina, described this
assessment as determining whether a defendant “pre-qualified” for release.
Interview with John Medina, supra note 1. Thomas H. Cohen, of the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, engaged in preliminary research asking “whether monitoring
practices or selection effects account for the efficacy of [commercial] surety
bond.” Cohen, supra, at 333. He posited that “if selection effects explain the
lower missed court appearance rate, the implications are that the commercial
bond industry does no better at preventing missed court appearances compared
to other forms of pretrial release.” Id. at 336. Using data from the U.S.
Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics’ State Court Processing
Statistics, id. at 351, the study’s methodology involved comparing flight risk
characteristics of felony defendants in counties where surety bond agents are
heavily utilized with counties where they play little or no role. Id. at 336–37.
Cohen determined that “SCPS data cannot be used to definitively establish
whether surety agents are selectively choosing the best defendants or using
various pretrial monitoring or retrieval techniques to ensure court appearances . .
. .” Id. at 381.
187
Cohen, supra note 186, at 347–48.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 348; Interview with John Medina, supra note 1.
190
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
191
Cf. supra text accompanying note 104 (noting the significance of the
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bail funds have been known to receive county funding192 indicates
that at least some legislators also believe they can work
successfully.
Of course, licensing is about more than having the power to
surrender a defendant back to authorities. In Miranda, the Bronx
court raised a number of concerns that went beyond licensing,
some of which were distinct to the Bronx Freedom Fund.193 The
following portion of this Note assesses the court’s concerns and
determines that some of the aspects of the Freedom Fund that the
court viewed as contrary to good policy are actually among the
reasons why the Bronx Freedom Fund’s model can be effective.
One of the court’s concerns was the fact that the Freedom Fund
was established and run with donated funds.194 The project was
initially funded by grant195 and subsequently began accepting
donations from the general public.196 There are a number of
advantages to a bail fund that operates off of donations. For one,
this strategy helps to conserve space in jails without using taxpayer
dollars, a point the bail bond industry often touts for itself.197
Additionally, dependence on donors may serve to give such a bail
fund a heightened sense of responsibility. If the project fails to
operate well, funds would be depleted, donors would be scarce and
reputations could suffer as a consequence. In contrast, when a bail
fund receives legislative funding, that funding may be tied as
closely to fiscal health as it is to the fund’s performance.198 And
power of arrest to Vera’s projects).
192
See supra note 145 and accompanying text (noting that other New York
bail funds have received public funds).
193
See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009).
194
Id. at *15.
195
Steinberg & Towns, supra note 127, at 21.
196
See BRONX FREEDOM FUND, http://www.bronxfreedomfund.org (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (allowing visitors to donate by credit card); see also
Katha Pollitt, ‘Tis the Season to Be Generous, THE NATION, Jan. 5, 2009,
available at http://www.thenation.com/article/tis-season-be-generous (listing the
Freedom Fund as one of ten suggestions for year-end donations).
197
See supra text accompanying notes 42–43 (concerning the claim that
commercial bonding saves taxpayer funds).
198
See John Mariani, Stanczyk Wants Mahoney to Restore Onondaga
County Bail Expeditor, THE POST-STANDARD (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.
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regardless of the fund’s success rate, if legislators believe that the
fund has become unpopular in the eyes of their constituents, the
project could come to an abrupt halt.199
In addition, the Miranda court was troubled that the initial
grant money had since been mixed with donations from unknown
individuals.200 The court reasoned that although charities generally
need not have a screening mechanism to determine the source of
donations, the fact that the money would be used to post bail put a
“special responsibility” on the parties seeking donations.201 The
legal grounds for examining the source of money or property
deposited as bail stems from section 520.30(1) of the New York
State Criminal Procedure Law.202 The Miranda court cited People
syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2009/02/stanczyk_wants_mahoney_to_rest.html.
The [Onondaga County] Bail Expeditor Program was among more than
two dozen contracts with human service providers that [County
Executive Joanie] Mahoney canceled last month as part of her effort to
close a $10.7 million budget gap . . . . The county provided the lion’s
share of the program’s budget, which included $108,000 to pay two
full-time and one part-time staff members and to maintain a $15,000
revolving bail fund. From that pool, the program posted half of the the
[sic] bail set for poor defendants accused—not convicted—of nonviolent misdemeanors. The program got the money bail back if the
defendant showed up for court.
Id.
199
This is not to say that a bail fund receiving legislative funding would not
be motivated to perform well for fear of losing those funds. Rather, a taxpayerfunded project might lose funding on political whim, regardless of its success
rate.
200
People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *7 n.8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009).
201
Id.
202
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.30 (1) (McKinney 2009).
The court may inquire into any matter stated or required to be stated in
the justifying affidavits, and may also inquire into other matters
appropriate to the determination, which include but are not limited to . .
. (a) [t]he background, character and reputation of any obligor, and, in
the case of an insurance company bail bond, the qualifications of the
surety-obligor and its executing agent; and (b) [t]he source of any
money or property deposited by any obligor as security, and whether
any such money or property constitutes the fruits of criminal or
unlawful conduct; and (c) [t]he source of any money or property
delivered or agreed to be delivered to any obligor as indemnification on
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v. Agnello203 as support for its reasoning that “[p]ublic policy
dictates that the source of all money intended to be used to post
bail be ascertainable.”204 However, in interpreting section 520.30,
both People v. Agnello and People v. Esquivel,205 the case whose
rational Agnello follows, concluded that when an obligor, such as a
bonding company, is indemnified by a third party, it is the
indemnitor who bears much of the risk of the defendant’s flight.206
Accordingly, the court must be allowed to consider the relationship
between the defendant and the indemnitor and to determine the
indemnitor’s motive for assuming the risk of forfeiture. If, for
example, the indemnitor shares no special relationship with the
defendant, but instead had been coerced into assuming this risk, the
arrangement would hardly deter the defendant’s flight.207 The
Esquivel court worried that accepting the bond simply because it
had been posted by a licensed company would make it easier for
defendants to bribe or coerce third parties to post collateral.208
the bond, and whether any such money or property constitutes the fruits
of criminal or unlawful conduct; and (d) [t]he background, character
and reputation of any person who has indemnified or agreed to
indemnify an obligor upon the bond; and whether any such indemnitor,
not being licensed by the superintendent of insurance in accordance
with the insurance law, has within a period of one month prior to such
indemnity transaction given indemnification or security for like
purpose in more than two cases not arising out of the same transaction;
and (e) [t]he source of any money posted as cash bail, and whether any
such money constitutes the fruits of criminal or unlawful conduct; and
(f) [t]he background, character and reputation of the person posting
cash bail.
Id.
203

People v. Agnello, 705 N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (Sup. Ct. Queens County

2000).
204
205

Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *7 n.8.
People v. Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d 541, 547 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

1993).
206

Agnello, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 528.
See id.
208
Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 541. In Esquivel, the indemnitors had pledged
their home as collateral for a defendant whom they barely knew. Id. at 542–43.
For an argument that the defendant should not bear the burden of proof in bail
sufficiency hearings, see generally John C. Longmire, CPL § 520.30: New York
Supreme Court Holds that Defendant Has the Burden of Proving that Collateral
207
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That concern—that a defendant could raise bail money by
illegal activity or threaten a third party to post collateral while
avoiding a bail source inquiry—209is sharply mitigated, if it exists
at all, as long as the fund makes an independent assessment of each
defendant when determining whether to post bail.210 Defendants
would have no means to ensure that they would in any way benefit
from a donation that they had obtained through coercion or other
illegal activities. This means that the identity of the fund’s
contributors is not material to whether a defendant will be more or
less likely to flee. Rather, since a bail fund assumes the risk of
forfeiture directly, the court need only look to the relationship
between the fund and the defendant to make an informed decision
as to whether to accept the bail. A bail fund that solicits
anonymous donations does not pose the same concerns that were
present in Esquivel and Agnello. The rationale in those cases does
not support scrutinizing general donations that are not targeted
toward any particular defendant. Instead, those two decisions stand
more for the proposition that the sole fact of licensure cannot
legitimize bail money; the judiciary must be free to scrutinize the
relationship between the defendant and the person or entity
assuming the financial risk when examining the sufficiency of the
bail.
The more fundamental question that arises when bail money is
provided by anonymous donors is whether the accused will feel
motivated to appear in court when friends or family do not have to
forfeit money or property because of his or her failure to appear. In
other words, it is important to consider other incentives that may
exist when someone close to the defendant is not putting money or
property on the line. Vera’s bail bond supervision projects
confirmed that the increased possibility of receiving probation
from a judge could provide a powerful incentive for defendants to
comply with the conditions of release.211 Avoiding time served in
Posted to Indemnify a Bail Bond Obligor Is Not the Fruit of Criminal or
Unlawful Activity, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 297 (1994).
209
Esquivel, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
210
See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009) (noting that the Bronx Freedom
Fund made such an independent assessment).
211
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 2.
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jail was a shared goal for both the projects and the accused.212 A
bail fund and its beneficiaries also share that goal.213 In addition to
the hope of a lighter sentence, the threat of a bail jumping
charge,214 or even a simple reminder of a court date, can motivate a
defendant to appear in court.215 But for more serious offenses or
more troubled clients, a simple reminder may not suffice. For
Vera’s Bronx agency, which maintained a high degree of
supervision over defendants, sustaining contact with participants
was not enough to ensure compliance.216 It is in this regard that the
particulars of the Bronx Freedom Fund become important to
whether its basic model can fare well in the Bronx, where Vera’s
agency, by its own accounts, failed.
Vera’s project faced severe challenges in the Bronx.217 Even at
the intake stage, because of the vast and bureaucratic nature of the
New York City system, the Bronx agency had difficulty
identifying and making contact with defendants.218 By contrast, the
Bronx Freedom Fund’s connection to one defense organization
enabled it to identify suitable clients with much greater ease.219
Vera’s agency faced even greater challenges once it had bailed

212

Id.
See Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69 (discussing aim
of avoiding jail sentences).
214
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 215.55–57 (McKinney 2010).
215
See supra text accompanying note 189 (stating that, particularly for less
serious offenses, missed court dates are often the result of forgetfulness); see
also Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *9 (noting that the Freedom Fund’s project
director would remain in contact with clients, reminding them of scheduled
appearances throughout the release period).
216
See supra text accompanying notes 124–25 (explaining that Vera’s
Bronx agency had to be discontinued).
217
See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 19.
218
Id.
219
See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 (explaining that a Bronx
Defenders attorney would contact the Freedom Fund’s project director with
information about a defendant to whom the attorney had been assigned as
counsel and, based upon that information as well as information from the CJA
report included in the client’s court file, the director would determine whether
the Freedom Fund should post bail in that case); see also supra notes 84–86 and
accompanying text (detailing information included in a defendant’s CJA report).
213
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each defendant out of jail.220 The area surrounding Vera’s project
office was distressed and it was difficult to engage participants in
programs or productive activities.221 The agency was unable to find
space for participants in local residential drug treatment centers
and even outpatient services were insufficient.222 Vera’s report
states that some felt that the agency “was detached from the
borough’s social service community and that inexperienced staff
did not know where and how to access services other than
outpatient drug treatment.”223 These deficiencies highlight one of
the more important differences between Vera’s Bronx agency and
the Bronx Freedom Fund. By working with only Bronx Defenders’
clients, the Freedom Fund benefited from the roots that
organization has put down in the Bronx community and the social
service net that it already has in place.224 Additional support for
this proposition lies in Vera’s reasoning as to why its Nassau and
Essex agencies performed well. The Nassau agency benefited from
using one provider for drug treatment; this allowed the staff from
Vera’s agency and the drug treatment provider to become familiar
with each other, and with each other’s rules and procedure.225
Working with many different providers, however, led to
instability.226 In Essex, in-house services provided an effective
means of supervising and controlling project participants.227
Similarly, the strong support system that the Bronx Defenders
provides to its clients228 is really what helped the bail fund project
220

See VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 20.
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id.
224
See Community Connections, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronx
defenders.org/our-work/community-connections (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
225
VERA 1995, supra note 101, at 25.
226
Id.
227
Id. at 22.
228
See Holistic Defense, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.
org/our-work/holistic-defense (last visited Sept. 15, 2010) (“Located in the heart
of the South Bronx, our office has been engaged in a constant dialogue with the
community we serve . . . . As holistic defenders we are committed to providing
our clients with seamless access to services to meet [their legal and social
support] needs.”); Read More, BRONX FREEDOM FUND, supra note 69 (“We
connect our clients with services and support for the duration of their cases,
221
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to get off the ground.229
The Miranda decision focuses on problems that the Bronx
court found in the relationship between a bail fund and a defenders
office.230 In distinguishing the Freedom Fund from other New
York bail funds, the court noted that “[e]very indigent member of
the communities served by [those] . . . organizations has an
opportunity to apply for the bail money.”231 Without discussing the
point in detail, the court went on to state that the Freedom Fund
“operates according to a [prohibited] ‘pre-arrest’ agreement-its
own certificate of incorporation indicates that it has agreed to post
bail exclusively for future clients of the Bronx Defenders.”232 But
given that it is the court system that assigns indigent defendants
from the community to the Bronx Defenders, and that the Freedom
Fund would then make an independent determination whether to
post bail in a given case, 233 it is difficult to imagine that regulators
could have had this kind of arrangement in mind when they
defined and prohibited “pre-arrest agreements” in order to “prevent
the use of the bail bond business in the furtherance of organized
crime.”234
The opinion does touch on an aspect of the relationship that
raises a more fundamental question. Although the court did not
ensuring that they not only meet their court obligations but also get assistance to
stabilize their lives in the long term.”).
229
The Freedom Fund’s connection with the Bronx Defenders is also what
drew initial donors in the first place. Telephone Interview with Robin G.
Steinberg, Executive Dir., The Bronx Defenders & Zoë Towns, Project Dir., The
Bronx Freedom Fund (Sept. 26, 2009).
230
People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 WL 2170254, at *1, *10–
19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County June 22, 2009).
231
Id. at *10.
232
Id. at *12. New York regulation provides that no licensed bail bond
agent “shall enter into any agreement with any party, the purpose of which is to
provide, on a continuing basis, for the furnishing of any bail bond, or other
security in lieu of bond, on behalf of any person other than the aforesaid party
who may be arrested on criminal charges.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
11, § 28.1(a) (2009). Automobile clubs or insurers are explicitly exempted. Id.
§ 28.1(c).
233
See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 (describing the process through
which the Freedom Fund decides whether to post bail).
234
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, §§ 28.0–28.1 (2009).
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rule on the issue, citing a lack of clear legal precedent,235 the
District Attorney’s office suggested that the involvement of
defense attorneys with the bail fund might present a possible
ethical violation.236 An article cited in the Miranda opinion,237
Take the Money or Run: The Risky Business of Acting as Both Your
Client’s Lawyer and Bail Bondsman, discusses this issue in
detail.238 After surveying statutes and ethics opinions across the
nation, the authors determined that it is the “prevailing view” that
an attorney should not act as bondsperson for his or her client.239
However, this view rests almost entirely on the financial
relationship that exists when an attorney posts his or her own funds
as bail for a client, and the risk that the attorney’s personal
financial interests will conflict with his or her ability to act in the
client’s interests.240 The Freedom Fund avoided that conflict
because the Bronx Defenders attorneys would take on no personal
financial risk when donated funds were used to post bail for their
clients.241 Moreover, Rule 1.8(e) of the Rules of Professional
Conduct,242 which provides that “a lawyer shall not advance or
guarantee financial assistance to the client,” goes on to carve out
235

Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *19.
Id. at *16.
237
Id. at *18 n.25.
238
See generally Dayla S. Pepi & Donna D. Bloom, Article, Take the
Money or Run: The Risky Business of Acting as Both Your Client’s Lawyer and
Bail Bondsman, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 933 (2006).
239
Id. at 948.
240
See id. at 976–77 (“[T]he practice of acting as bail bondsman for a
criminal defendant client raises ethical concerns in four areas: (1) conflict with
the client involving the lawyer’s own potentially adverse pecuniary interest;
(2) protection of client confidentiality; (3) improper solicitation of clients; and
(4) financial relationships between a lawyer and his client.”). New York’s
legislature has made it clear that it disapproves of lawyers having a financial
interest in bail, providing that “[a]ny member of the bar having any financial
interest by which he is to profit from the giving of bail shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.” N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2009) (emphasis added).
See also N.Y. St. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993), available
at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&CONTE
NTID=5427&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm.
241
See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *3 (indicating that funding is
derived from charitable donations).
242
Id. at *16.
236
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an exception for “a lawyer representing an indigent or pro bono
client [who] may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on
behalf of the client.”243 American Bar Association Formal Ethics
Opinion 04-432, addresses that rule directly, stating that posting a
client’s bail can be considered among “court costs and expenses of
litigation.”244
A more serious question is whether, when there is a connection
between a defense organization and a bail fund, the client might
see the two organizations as one and the same.245 Clients will
understand that the fund risked money to bail them out of jail and
might not want to forfeit those funds.246 In Take the Money or Run,
the authors posed the problem this way:
If the client screens . . . information because of worries
about what the attorney may choose to disclose to the court,
she may censor relevant information . . . . Given the
necessity for complete candor . . . any confusion about the
attorney’s role influencing the client to withhold
information is a serious risk . . . .247
But a client’s recognition that her defense organization played
a role in helping her to attain pretrial release, at no cost to herself,
is far more likely to foster a stronger attorney-client relationship.
Additionally, clients who are not incarcerated pretrial can contact
their attorneys with ease, do not have to meet with counsel in the
confines of a detention center, and can appear in court after having
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N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 (2009) (Rule 1.8(e)).
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432
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See Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *4 (showing concern over the
Freedom Fund’s shared office space).
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See id. at *9 (noting that the Freedom Fund’s project director would
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slept, bathed, and dressed outside of a detention facility.248 In
reality, there is less reason to wonder whether a bail fund can
fulfill its responsibilities to its clients than to ask whether the fund
is capable of meeting its obligations to the court.
As the Miranda opinion notes, a person who bails an individual
out of jail enters into a contract with the court.249 Upon posting
cash bail, that person signs an undertaking that states in part: “I
undertake that the defendant will appear in this action whenever
required . . . and I acknowledge that the bail will be forfeited if the
defendant does not comply with any requirement or order of
process to appear in this action.”250 One of the concerns underlying
most of the Bronx court’s discussion is the view that the Freedom
Fund had not taken proper steps to fulfill that responsibility.251 The
court noted that the Freedom Fund’s board had authorized the
project director to use her independent discretion to bail clients out
of jail when accused of violent felonies,252 and that the Freedom
Fund’s method of determining whether or not to bail out a client
was, as compared to the factors a court considers pursuant to
section 510.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law, not a full “flight
risk” assessment.253 In response to these concerns, one might argue
248

See BRONX FREEDOM FUND, http://www.bronxfreedomfund.org (last
visited Sept. 15, 2010) (observing that the Freedom Fund enables clients to
“fight their cases from a position of strength and freedom”).
249
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *11.
250
Id. at *2.
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See id. at *8–9, *10.
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Id. at *6. But see Thomas Adcock, Pilot Program Provides Bail Money
for Indigent, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 7, 2007, at 24, col. 2 (describing the clients who
would benefit as those who had been “arrested for non-violent offenses and
whose Criminal Justice Agency pretrial evaluation shows little risk of flight”).
253
Miranda, 2009 WL 2170254, at *8 n.10. The original written criteria
that the Freedom Fund used to determine whether to post bail were developed
by the Freedom Fund’s founders and project director and attorneys from both
inside and outside the Bronx Defenders. Id. at *4. The final criteria were
ultimately approved by the Freedom Fund’s Board of Directors. Id. Those
criteria included four factors: “the person must be a ‘client of the Bronx
Defenders;’ the client’s ‘bail is $1500 or below;’ the ‘top charge is misdemeanor
or non-violent felony;’ and the ‘CJA score or adjusted/corrected CJA score [is] 3
or above.’” Id. (alteration in original). The Freedom Fund did not view a
defendant’s criminal history as relevant to whether they would appear in court.
Id. at *8 n.10.
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that since the court set bail in the first place by conducting its own
flight risk assessment, we should rely only on the surety’s
willingness to take on the financial risk for assurance that the
defendant will appear.254 But that view has been rejected in other
cases, which have held that a court acts within its discretion if it
finds that a lack of relationship between a principal and surety is
reason to disapprove cash bail.255 More importantly, in the absence
of legislative funding and licensing, neither of which is ideal for a
bail fund because of the drawbacks each presents,256 it is judicial
oversight that can lend legitimacy to the bail fund’s operations.257
If we accept that the judiciary should examine a bail fund’s
reasoning or motives in posting bail, what then is it that should
guide the court’s inquiry?
The judiciary does not expect commercial bail bond agents to
conduct a full flight risk assessment.258 Rather, judges recognize
that “[t]he surety is a business enterprise [whose] primary concern
is to be indemnified if the bail is forfeited.”259 Accordingly, judges
adjust the monetary value of the bond to account for both the risk
that a defendant will abscond and the financial resources available
to the defendant.260 Whether or not a system of financial release is
the most effective method, it is the basis upon which judges make
the bail determination; therefore, if a bail fund does not require the
defendant to incur the financial risk the judge believes he or she
will incur, that bail fund may undermine the judicial decision.
Judge Lasker, in the Southern District Court of New York, once

254

See infra text accompanying notes 258–59 (indicating that to a certain
extent the judiciary will not examine the business decisions of a commercial
surety).
255
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noted this concern:
[T]he establishment of a bail fund might well undermine
the bail decisions made by state court judges. When judges
set bail, they are obligated to do so on the basis of the
resources available to the defendant or his sureties. If
judges are not aware of the existence of a bail fund, they
may be setting bail based on inaccurate assumptions about
the resources available to the defendant. If they are aware
of such a fund, they are left uncertain as to whether their
bail rulings will be effective.261
Judges have been instructed to consider certain statutorily
mandated factors, including the defendant’s financial resources, in
making their release decisions.262 If judges—figures central to the
pretrial process—263feel that their decisions are being undermined,
one risk is that release and bail decisions may become more
inconsistent, arbitrary, and inequitable.264 But as long as judges are
fully informed of the existence and nature of any bail fund,
including the criteria the fund employs in its bail determination,
the judiciary is still positioned to fulfill its own responsibilities
with regard to bail and the conditions of pretrial release. The bail
fund, as surety, can be expected to provide the court with that
information when requested or risk the court rejecting the bail.
Judicial oversight can provide a more flexible and nuanced means
of “legitimizing” an active bail fund than licensing or legislative
funding would permit. That kind of oversight could allow more
advocates the opportunity to craft solutions to what has been an
enduring problem.
From the perspective of an advocate, adjusting internal
decision making in order to appeal to more members of the
judiciary is not without its disadvantages. Vera’s bail bond
agencies illustrate this point. The agencies were a collaborative
261

Benjamin v. Sielaff, No. 75 Civ. 3073 (MEL), 1990 WL 212911, at *2
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262
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effort, operating with direct involvement from the courts and the
city and state.265 That involvement did pose some problems for
Vera. For one, there was a focus on conserving jail space,266 which
would likely be unimportant to an organization that was not
receiving public funds. Given the evidence that lengthier periods of
pretrial supervision led to more difficulties in controlling
participants,267 that emphasis might have been misguided. Judicial
oversight sometimes presented other difficulties for Vera. Because
the projects were accountable to judges for the degree of
supervision exercised, Vera’s staff members were unable to use
their discretion to ease pressure on a defendant without judicial
approval, which in the Bronx was rarely given.268 That effect of
judicial control is probably frustrating for advocates who see the
general pattern of judicial decisions as flawed.269 But in order for
the judiciary to be the body overseeing a bail fund’s operations, the
fund’s internal decision making must be subject to judicial review.
When an entity posting bail has some sort of legislative sanction,
through either funding or licensing, the court is likely to show
more deference in approving the bail. In contrast, where a fund has
not received such sanction, the court may be concerned if the fund
is not taking into consideration the factors that the legislature has
deemed important to the bail determination. In order for the
judiciary to have confidence in a bail fund, which necessarily
exercises much less control over its clients than a program like
Vera’s, the criteria the fund uses to select defendants takes on more
importance. Hence the Bronx court’s concern that the Freedom
265
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Fund was not performing a full flight risk assessment.270
This concern is perhaps increased where the bail fund is
connected to a defense organization. The Bronx Defenders’
solution to this foreseeable problem seems to have been to insulate
the decision making process from the defense attorneys.271 But
considering that the defense attorneys took part in drafting the
initial criteria for release,272 one might expect that the Freedom
Fund’s goals and considerations largely mirror that of the defense
organization, which does nothing to alleviate the court’s concern
that the Freedom Fund failed to conduct appropriate release
assessments. A bail fund could directly address the court’s
complaint that the Freedom Fund seemed to be operating pursuant
to “secret rules,”273 by, first, having a board lay down more
concrete criteria, rather than authorizing a director to exercise his
or her discretion in all cases, and, then, being open about those
criteria. This is particularly fitting for a fund that accepts donations
from the public.274 The tactic of the Washtenaw bail fund275 was to
exclude staff and attorneys from board membership with the belief
that it would allow the board to operate more objectively.276 After
receiving relevant information from a staff person, a majority vote
of the Washtenaw bail fund’s board was required to post bail.277
Besides being more difficult to implement, laying out more
concrete criteria or involving members of the community in the
decision of whether to post bail could frustrate a bail fund’s goals.
It could delay the release process and it could make certain
270
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defendants ineligible for the bail money if such criteria took into
account one’s criminal history or the charge severity. That harkens
back to the problem inherent in the current system—that some
defendants who have been charged with more serious offenses, can
easily pay for their release while a defendant charged with
misdemeanor assault may remain in jail pretrial, with less ability to
mount a defense and more incentive to plead guilty even when
innocent.278 However, increased board involvement in the actual
bail determination, more definite guidelines, and more clarity as to
what those guidelines are, would be achievable means through
which a bail fund could operate with a higher degree of
accountability, laying the foundation for more widespread support
from judges.
CONCLUSION
Having successfully posted bail for approximately 130
defendants before the Miranda court rejected bail posted by the
Bronx Freedom Fund,279 it is likely that a number of judges in the
Bronx would disagree that a nonprofit bail fund is cause for any
concern. But while there is bound to be disagreement over some or
all of the points made by the court in Miranda, what should not be
so contentious is that the judge raised these issues and took them
seriously. As one pretrial researcher put it:
The bail decision, to release or detain a defendant pending
trial and the setting of terms and conditions of bail, is a
monumental task which carries enormous consequences not
only for the pretrial defendant but also for the safety of the
community, the integrity of the judicial process, and the
utilization of our often overtaxed criminal justice resources.
The bail decision is the responsibility of the Court.280
278
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Indigent defendants are not served by the money bail system.281
Because such defendants also frequently lack strong community
ties, bail is set and, without financial assistance or a more
“appealing” plea bargain, many remain in jail pretrial.282 The costeffectiveness and feasibility of the Bronx Freedom Fund’s effort to
address this problem is in large part attributable to its relationship
with the Bronx Defenders.283 A relationship with a wellestablished defense organization enables a bail fund to give
meaningful support to released clients without subjecting them to
extreme levels of supervision that in some cases may be
counterproductive.284 If advocates taking this approach hope to
attract a broader base of support or to have their projects replicated
elsewhere, some of the concerns raised in the Miranda opinion
remain. While oversight can be accomplished to some degree
through licensing or by putting public funds toward a bail fund, a
privately run fund that is subject to judicial oversight has the
benefit of potentially greater financial security and the advantage
of more flexibility in making its bail determinations.285 Some
flexibility is important if we hope to develop innovative ways of
addressing pretrial injustice. However, in order to win support
from the judiciary, a bail fund may benefit from laying out criteria
to be used in their bail determination that takes into account the
factors that the judiciary must consider by legislative mandate.
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